

**EXPOSITION OF COGNITIVE AND PSYCHOLOGICAL FACTORS OF THE
PHENOMENA REALIS/IRREALIS**

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Abstract:

The article is devoted to psychological and cognitive analyzes of the categories of realis/irrealis. The scope of linguistic analysis is expanding rather than the philosophical and logical approaches of analyzing the contrast between the events occurring in real life and the events related to the world of human imagination, desire, plan, etc.

Key words: realis/irrealis, objective realis, functions of modal categories, discursive, illocutionary, epistemic mood, philosophical and logical approaches, communicative-pragmatic point of view, evaluative, deontic

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W. Cheif states that the ideas expressed in words are compared to the “objective realis” and the presented information is classified as realis or irrealis. At the same time, it points out that there are reasons to believe that the functions of modal categories are more discourse-oriented. Moods are used for other discursive or illocutionary functions. Imperatives and prohibitives imply a hint rather than an affirmation, while epistemic moods soften the strong affirmative meaning of a sentence. Subordinating moods indicate the background character of the sentence, so it is not confirmed even if it is consistent with the sentence. For example, “She doesn’t feel well” in English. From the example of “Its strange, he is late”, it can be clearly understood that it is not the realis or irrealis phenomena of reality, but how the speaker’s opinion expresses his attitude in the speech that is important.

Thus, both J. Bybee and T. Givon criticize the traditional definition of irrealis for not having a functional basis, relying on a logical understanding of the reality of the situation [J.Bybee, 1994, p. 265-337; T.Givon, 1994, p. 265-337].

Nevertheless, in subsequent works, the scope of linguistic analysis is expanding rather than the philosophical and logical approaches of analyzing the contrast between the events occurring in real life and the events related to the world of human imagination, desire, plan, etc. Accordingly, attention is paid to the importance of taking psychological and cognitive factors into account when defining the realist category. In general, to define realis/irrealis categories or to create a precise definition, it is necessary to carry out comparative typological work within a number of languages.

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Thus, at present, various definitions of the realist category attract our attention. They express chronologically, the most common and “permanent” aspects based on the logical tradition, while some definitions describe realist phenomenon in the form of a communication-based category. One of them belongs to the pen of T. Givon, and the other one was proposed by J. Bybee as a “hypothetical definition”:

1. Realis describes events related to real reality, irrealis describes events related to imaginary reality [J. R. Roberts, 1990, p. 363–401];

2. Realis corresponds to a proposition that can be asserted as true. Irrealis corresponds to an affirmative proposition as an unknown, uncertain phenomenon [T. Givon, 1994, p. 265–337];

3. Realis affirmative propositions are connected with sentences that are not affirmative or weakly affirmative in the opposite sense [J. Bybee, 1998, p. 257–271].

Undoubtedly, it is important to describe the semantics of a certain grammatical category from a communicative-pragmatic point of view. However, in the practical use of the concepts of “realis” and “irrealis”, it seems effective to refer to “logical” and “pragmatic” approaches.

Although the definitions of realis and irrealis differ, all of them do not deny the opposition between “realis – irrealis”. These definitions differ, first of all, according to the degree of completeness of reality. Linguists who use the logical definition talk about the proposition's direct relation to reality. In particular, T. Givon considers that it is wrong to give a firm conclusion about the speaker's information. In fact, they are not opposites. It is important to determine which of the logical or communicative-cognitive components prevails in the semantics of the Realis category [T. Givon, 1982, p. 115–163].

It is known that in many languages, the past tense is evaluated as a habitualis event. Habitualis is a type of irrealis that does not have a basic grammatical form. However, habitualis is a mixture that combines some of the typical features of realis, including a high degree of assertion of belief, and the typical features of irrealis, such as the absence of a definite tense, the absence of specific representations of the situation, and the absence of the features of habitualis noun phrases. is a modality. Thus, it is not surprising that some languages attempt to combine habitualis with other irrealis meanings [T. Givon, 1994, p. 322].

Subtypes of epistemic modality are communicative equivalents based on the logical tradition:

- a) assumption of absolute truth;
- b) factual truth, statement;
- c) probable truth, unrealistic statement;
- d) a false statement of fact.

A communicative definition of epistemic modality:

- a) Realis interpretation:

The validity of the offer is strongly confirmed. However, the listener's suspicions are considered reasonable. The speaker gives evidence or other good reasons to defend his or her knowledge or strong beliefs.

- b) Interpretation of Irrealis:

The offer can be confirmed without force. As far as possible, likely or similar, implementation is carried out in the way of attitude to reality, which is doubtful (epistemic modality) or, as necessary, acceptable or unacceptable (evaluative or

deontic, modality). However, the speaker does not try to confirm the truth of the statement with evidence or other serious reasons. On the contrary, he expects or even provokes objections from the audience [T. Givon, 1994, p. 267-269].

In addition, the author focuses on identifying the remnants of the logical interpretation of modality as the opposition between realis and irrealis as the opposition between “real” and “unreal” phenomena.

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